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Abstract 
  Taking inspiration from James Tartaglia’s Philosophy in a Meaningless Life, I suggest a way out of 
the present dialectical stalemate in analytic philosophy of free will and moral responsibility. The key 
concept employed in my proposal is transcendence, i.e., our remarkable ability to self-relativize by 
stepping back from the social framework understanding which determines our systems of value. 
Analytic philosophers who favor one of the standard, determinate and mutually exclusive positions 
in the free-will debate have marginalized this aspect of transcendence in human life. For if one 
conceives human life as essentially involving the movement of transcendence, then one can discern 
an element of self-deception in the analytic philosophers’ self-images of themselves as defenders of 
the one true theory, as cast within a fixed framework of language and thought. One of the central 
suggestions of this essay is that analytic philosophers – including myself – should abandon such a 
self-image, because when we philosophize, we are always already engaged in an endless effort of 
self-reflection, self-criticism and self-revision. I argue, in addition, that it is loyalty to the untenable 
self-image which forces the philosophical debate on free will and moral responsibility into a vicious 
deadlock. As such, my essay is an attempt to philosophically investigate the topic of free will 
without succumbing to the self-image of ‘Seeker of The Unique and Definitive Truth’. 
 
Preface 
 
A lesson which we can learn from James Tartaglia’s recently published book 
(Tartaglia 2016) is that to search for a straightforward answer to the question 
“What is the meaning of life?” is not among the tasks of philosophy. The reason 
why I stress this is because, in the present Anglophone philosophical literature, 
several prominent authors (e.g., Wolf 2010, Metz 2014) engage themselves in 
answering that question by proposing a determinate view about which factor or 
condition makes a person’s life meaningful. Tartaglia’s discourse developed in 
that book would, I suggest, fundamentally explicate why those philosophers’ 
approach to the issue of life’s meaning is on a wrong track. The problem is not 
that they do not give the right answer to the question, but that they care about a 
wrongfully oriented question. What is important here is therefore to reconsider 
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what we should ask, or more basically what we should aim at, when we 
philosophically talk about the meaning of life. 
Why, however, is this so? I.e., for what reason should we say that a direct 
approach to the simple question about life’s meaning is not an appropriate way 
to consider the issue in question? It might be roughly explained as follows. 
One of Tartaglia’s important suggestions is, as I understand it, that 
philosophy is an activity practiced through, and throughout, each of our lives. 
Or, in other words, each of us is involved in philosophy as her or his life goes 
on. Therefore, “philosophy, like life, needs no end” (Tartaglia 2016: 181). What 
we should grasp here is that there is a sense of the word in which we can say one 
keeps engaging oneself in ‘philosophy’ insofar as one’s life continues. We, in 
fact, continuously re-examine what we believe to be true and revise it, insofar as 
we live. If we call such an endlessly self-revising aspect of our life by the name 
‘philosophy’, it cannot be the case that some philosophical problem or another 
will be solved once and for all. 
Any determinate dogma such as, e.g., “The meaning of a person’s life 
consists in making the world better” thus does not belong to philosophy in this 
sense, because any supposed answer to what life’s meaning is should be 
reconsidered sooner or later, insofar as we live. Any activity of philosophy (in 
that sense) does not contain any moments properly described as ‘solutions’, 
‘proofs’, ‘rejections’ and so on. What philosophy really involves is rather, e.g., a 
never-ending effort to deepen our own understanding of our world and 
ourselves. The attempt to find a conclusive statement that the meaning of life is 
such-and-such, therefore, would not be any part of philosophy in that significant 
sense. 
Tartaglia explains such a conception of philosophy, i.e., philosophy as 
self-renewal as it were, in terms of ‘transcendence’. Human beings, he suggests, 
can transcend their world and themselves, and thereby continuously turn their 
understanding of reality into a new one. This transcending aspect of human life 
is a fundamental basis for one’s being able to engage oneself in philosophy as 
self-renewal. Many contemporary philosophers of the analytic tradition, 
unconsciously or not, tend to disregard such dialektische Bewegung of 
transcendence in human life, because they favor a statement that could be 
uniquely interpreted through a determinate model. This is possibly an 
unfortunate effect of logico-positivist partiality in the tradition of analytic 
philosophy. We, however, transcend our world and ourselves. Any philosophical 
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inquiry, if it intends to conceive human life as a whole, should not ignore our 
transcending essence. 
What I am going to do in this paper is to take over Tartaglia’s discourse 
about transcendence and enlarge it in a certain direction. One of my central 
suggestions is that the dialectical deadlock in the on-going controversy about 
free will and moral responsibility in analytic philosophy is caused by the 
participants neglecting that remarkable feature of transcendence in human life. 
“Are we free or not?” is also a question for which a straightforward answer 
should not naïvely be sought, as I will explain. We should rather transcend such 
a dichotomous framework of inquiry around ‘free’ or ‘unfree’ to jump into an 
arena where we could cooperate with each other to deepen our understanding of 
freedom. My concluding remark will be that we should accept a sort of 
contradictory view, or, more accurately, we should take a perspective, or 
Horizont, from which we can suppose that human beings are free in a significant 
sense; and at the same time significantly unfree as well. 
Someone might wonder why this conclusion is important. As a minimal 
reply to such doubt, I note here that, not only to solve a problem within a given 
framework, but also to deepen our understanding of the whole issue in question, 
can qualify as a fruit of philosophical work (I would suggest that Tartaglia’s 
contribution to philosophy consists not in solving a certain traditional problem 
but in creating a novel discourse in terms of which we can say a number of new 
things about our nature of engaging ourselves in philosophy). What I aim at in 
this paper is also not the solution of a certain problem but a deepening of our 
understanding of human existence. The analytic philosophers of free will and 
moral responsibility, at least in the last decades, tend to simply ask whether or 
not we are free and, as a result, remain in a stalemate where the pro-freedom and 
anti-freedom camps have nothing to say to each other. So, I will try to develop a 
‘narrative’ which would help us to take a detour away from, or find a way out of, 
that fruitless dead-end. 
The argument of this paper runs as follows. To begin with, I introduce the 
status quo of the free-will debate and explain how it falls into a stalemate 
(Section 1). Next, I present some of Tartaglia’s central suggestions in his book 
(Section 2), because they enable us to understand what is fundamentally 
responsible for the vicious stalemate in question. I will argue that it is 
“marginalization” of the concern about transcendence in the recent trend of 
analytic philosophy that makes the free-will debate unproductive (Sections 3 and 
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4). 
 
1. 
 
The participants in the on-going controversy about free will are roughly 
divided into three camps, i.e., libertarians, compatibilists, and free will skeptics, 
as you would already know. These positions are defined in relation to the 
metaphysical thesis of determinism, as you again already know. If a person 
believes that the truth of determinism is compatible with the existence of human 
freedom, then she is a compatibilist, and if not, then an incompatibilist. Among 
the incompatibilists, there are two subgroups, i.e., libertarians who deny 
determinism but affirm the existence of free will, and free will skeptics who 
accept determinism and the non-existence of freedom. The compatibilists are 
naturally protagonists of freedom of will, because their arguing for the 
compatibility of determinism and human freedom pragmatically implies their 
commitment to the existence of free will. 
In most cases, a participant in the present free will debate would be 
categorized as an advocate of one of those three views: libertarianism, 
compatibilism, or free will skepticism. To randomly enumerate prominent 
figures: Robert Kane, Timothy O’Connor and Carl Ginet are libertarians; Harry 
Frankfurt, John Martin Fischer and Susan Wolf are compatibilists; and Galen 
Strawson, Derk Pereboom and Bruce Waller are free will skeptics. What each of 
them wishes to do in the debate is, most simply speaking, to find an argument 
which concludes that his or her position is right, or that a position which she or 
he does not accept is wrong. As the debate proceeds, more and more articulated 
arguments are proposed. We will learn a number of ‘fine’ conceptual distinctions 
as we follow their works. 
What I am going to argue in this section is that this framework of inquiry 
leads the debaters, sooner or later, to a stalemate of the vicious kind. Such a 
phenomenon is, I suggest, symptomtic of Richard Double’s experience. 
 
Several years ago at a meeting of the American Philosophical Association 
a very prominent incompatibilist commented on a paper delivered by a 
younger, less prominent, but very sharp compatibilist. The exchange 
between the two lasted the entire hour, and toward the end it became clear 
that neither speaker could understand at all why the other held the position 
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that he did: one spoke, the other just shook his head in disbelief. (Double 
1991: 5) 
 
I think that it is not simply contingent that these two philosophers from different 
camps finally ‘swear’ at each other. Such a quarrel sometimes happens in the 
free will debate because of the framework of inquiry, as explained in the 
following. 
Libertarianism, compatibilism, and free will skepticism are, in reality, 
defined as mutually exclusive. If, therefore, you presuppose that what 
philosophy of free will seeks would be an answer to the question of which of 
those positions is true, then your choosing of one of them inevitably entails your 
abandoning the other two. When, e.g., a compatibilist argues, in some way, that 
human freedom is realizable even under the truth of determinism, any 
incompatibilist should suggest that there must be something wrong with the 
argument in question, because the core of her position implies the negation of 
any compatibilist reconciliation between determinism and free will. 
The opposition between those camps is deeper than this, however. E.g., an 
incompatibilist could not be persuaded to convert to compatibilism insofar as 
she is an incompatibilist. For the effort of persuasion would make sense only if 
two opposing sides talk to each other about an issue of which at least one side 
can partly make a concession to the other. If, therefore, two positions with 
directly conflicting core ideas compete with each other by asking which of these 
ideas is right, then they reach, sooner or later, a place where both sides have 
nothing more to say than, e.g., “Our idea is intuitively correct” or “I can’t 
understand how you could accommodate such a view.” The free will debate thus 
very often ends in a kind of impasse where all the debaters can do is just repeat: 
“I cannot believe you are right.” (The same thing holds in many fields of 
analytic philosophy, e.g., the philosophy of mind debate among type-A 
physicalism, type-B physicalism and dualism. So, if my argument in this paper 
is right, it would be applicable to further areas.) 
I shall introduce an example which very typically represents the lack of 
mutual understanding in the free will debate.  
Derk Pereboom, a prominent free will skeptic as I mentioned above, 
suggests in his book that “if all of our behavior was ‘in the cards’ before we 
were born, […] then we cannot legitimately be blamed for our wrongdoing” 
(Pereboom 2001: 6). This is an expression of the core idea of incompatibilism, 
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and I suggest that all of us can sympathize with it to some degree. We have, in 
fact, many ways to construct discourses in which the idea in question would be 
understandable: “if our behavior was predetermined, we would contribute 
nothing to it,” “if all of our behavior was in the cards before we were born, 
someone who – or something which – had dealt the cards would be the true 
author of our behavior,” et cetera. John Martin Fischer, an eminent compatibilist 
as I mentioned above, however, opposes this idea in a very unsympathetic 
mood: 
 
Our behavior’s “being in the cards” is obviously metaphor. Pereboom 
means by this that conditions prior to our births “inevitably result in our 
behavior by a deterministic causal process.” If the problematic notion of 
inevitability simply implies the notion of entailment, then Pereboom’s 
claim just comes down to the unargued-for assumption that causal 
determination in the actual sequence rules out responsibility. Again, this is 
dialectically unhelpful. If “inevitability” also implies some sort of actual 
sequence compulsion, this is question-begging within the dialectic 
context. Why exactly is it the case that one’s behavior’s being “in the 
cards,” in the relevant sense, involves problematic compulsion and thus 
directly rules out moral responsibility? (Fischer 2002: 201) 
 
We should remark that what Fischer says in this quotation is, in short, that he 
cannot interpret Pereboom as saying something right about the matter at hand. 
Fischer just shrugs his shoulders and shakes his head. Certainly, it is natural, or 
even obligatory, for Fischer as a compatibilist to oppose the incompatibilist idea. 
But, I suggest that there is something wrong with the compatibilist’s directly 
refuting stance in considering incompatibilist ideas (the same thing can be said 
about any incompatibilist’s simple refusal of compatibilist intuitions). 
My suggestion here is not that the philosophers have to avoid any kind of 
conflict about their core views on a relevant issue. I rather admit that, insofar as 
philosophy is a serious project in our life, i.e., it faces ‘hard’ problems about our 
world and ourselves which are essentially different from any matter of mere 
taste, it is inevitable for our philosophical views to collide against each other. I 
suppose, in addition, that a philosophical opposition of the ‘legitimate’ type, if 
any exist, possibly reaches the extreme where two rivals will never be 
reconciled with each other, even if that opposition is very fruitful in the sense 
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that it will produce many novel narratives in the relevant field. Thus, not every 
opposition ought to be prevented, but what type of opposition holds does matter, 
and it is the unproductive type of conflict that should be avoided, as I shall argue 
in this section. 
What I will criticize is, in a word, a presupposition of the free will debate as 
a whole, consciously or unconsciously held by the participants concerning the 
orientation of inquiry. I would like, in other words, to criticize the debaters’ 
understanding of what philosophy of free will aims at. Except for several 
remarkable non-standard authors1, all the participants of the free will debate 
presuppose that a certain view on free will is ‘objectively’ correct and that what 
they ought to seek is the ‘true’ theory of human freedom. They suppose, in 
consequence, that at most one of libertarianism, compatibilism, and free will 
skepticism, is true – and hence two of them must be false. The assumption that 
there is one objectively true conception of free will thus orients the debaters 
toward a simple battle in which the only thing each camp should do is to defend 
itself and attack the others. 
What, however, if we human beings are free in that we can ‘transcend’ a 
fixed orientation of inquiry? Or, what if we are free in that we can ‘destruct’ a 
given framework of intellectual activities and ‘construct’ a new way of discourse 
which would enable us to engage ourselves in investigation in a radically 
different way? And, what if our deeper freedom consists in such a transcending 
creation? Then, we cannot but doubt the legitimacy of the ‘naïve’ research 
project in seeking one true theory of free will. I will come back to this point 
later. 
What I am arguing is that the ‘triadic’ competition of libertarianism, 
compatibilism, and free will skepticism ends by falling into a vicious deadlock. I 
present another example. In the final paragraph of his paper, focused on 
clarification of his conception of agent causation, Randolph Clarke tentatively 
identifies the reason why many of us would reject compatibilism (and 
non-agent-causal libertarianism) by saying that, 
 
we find unsatisfactory any view of free will that allows that everything 
                                                     
1 Honderich 1993/2002, Double 1991, 1996, Smilansky 2000, and Sommers 2012 suppose that what 
philosophy of free will should aim at is not to find a straightforward answer to the question of whether 
or not we are free but to consider, e.g., the following question about life: With what idea of freedom 
should we live? I would like to consider a genealogy of such non-standard thinkers elsewhere. 
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that causally brings about an agent’s action is itself causally brought about 
by something in the distant past. Certainly any freedom of will that we 
enjoy on such a view, if not a complete fraud, is a pale imitation of 
freedom that is characterized by an agent-causal account. (Clarke 1993: 
298) 
 
The compatibilists immediately contend that they, and a number of us, would 
not find that view unsatisfactory! I stress again that all of us could sympathize 
with their claim to some degree, as well as Clarke’s. We have, in fact, many 
ways to construct discourses in which the compatibilist idea would be 
understandable: “some significant concept of freedom must be compatible with 
the truth of determinism, because, on the one hand, we cannot but distinguish 
‘free’ persons from ‘unfree’ insofar as we ordinarily differentiate normal adults 
from children, mere animals, or adults with ‘abnormal’ conditions, and, on the 
other hand, the distinction of ‘free’ and ‘unfree’ in this sense must be realizable 
even in a strict causal connection of events since it is undeniable that we human 
beings are a part of the causally connected totality of nature, in which human 
behavior should be regarded as an effect of the combination of past events.” But, 
if the debaters presuppose that at most one side among the compatibilists and 
Clarke have it right, then all that each side can finally do is just spit out, “I have 
no idea why you think so.” 
I repeatedly suggest that such lack of mutual understanding is problematic. I 
realize, however, that my suggestion would be somehow difficult to accept, or 
even hard to understand, for people who have an analytic interest in scrutinizing 
the technically detailed arguments developed in the recent literature. I should 
add further that the traditional ‘triadic’ framework of the free will debate is not 
completely fruitless, because it has produced many illuminating conceptual 
distinctions, such as the difference between the ‘leeway’ and ‘source’ types of 
freedom.2 To touch upon my personal history, I learned very many things by 
reading texts written by prominent authors including Pereboom, Fischer and 
Clarke. In what sense, then, can I criticize the recent research interest of 
philosophy of free will? 
My criticism would be, I dare to say, a kind of hope, i.e., hope that 
                                                     
2 The ‘leeway’ type of freedom is defined by so-called alternative possibilities, while the ‘source’ type 
is characterized by origination, not necessarily by alternatives. This distinction added an important 
twist to the recent debate. 
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philosophy of free will would be further developed if the traditional framework 
can be overcome, or aufgehoben in the Hegelian sense. More concretely, I 
expect that, if we stop asking which of libertarianism, compatibilism, and free 
will skepticism is objectively true, then we will thereby keep away from the 
recent unproductive stalemate and be in a position to better say something which 
enables us to understand the matter in a novel and deeper way.  
While this paper might be interpreted as an anti-analytic-philosophy 
manifesto, I have no intention to say that the tendency to subtlety and rigidity 
found in the contemporary Anglophone literature is harmful. Insofar as all the 
philosophers are essentially critics of sloppy discourses (no philosopher as such 
intends to be an obscurantist!), it would be reasonable for them to pursue a 
‘rigid’ way of argumentation. It is, however, important for us to realize that there 
is “something it is easy to forget when we are engaged in philosophy, especially 
in our cool, contemporary style,” as Peter Strawson says (Strawson 1962: 77). 
We would, e.g., easily forget the transcending nature of our thinking, if we 
engaged ourselves in an analytic project to construct a logically consistent 
discourse about a given subject matter. More concretely, e.g., our familiarity 
with logical considerations developed throughout the history of analytic 
philosophy would urge us to scorn respect for the transcending movement of 
human thinking. There is, however, something true about a contradictory 
statement like “we are fundamentally free, and at the same time fundamentally 
unfree,” and the concept of transcendence would enable us to make sense of this 
statement in a significant way, which will be explained in Sections 3 and 4. In 
the next section, I will introduce, or re-construct in my own way, what Tartaglia 
says about the transcendent aspect of human thinking. 
   
2. 
 
Tartaglia, in the book in question, engages himself in philosophy in the 
dimension of transcendence, as it were. He does not construct his position in a 
fixed framework, but continuously ‘deconstructs’ the frameworks in which 
contemporary philosophy is performed. His argumentation could therefore be 
classed as non-standard, or even strange, because the mainstream of 
contemporary philosophy in the English-speaking world, i.e., analytic 
philosophy, tends to neglect or disrespect such a transcending movement of the 
human intellectual ability, as I suggested in the preface of this paper. Tartaglia 
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touches on the reason why analytic philosophy systematically ignores the 
phenomenon of transcendence, when he says 
 
[…] concerns about transcendence and the meaning of life have been 
marginalized over the course of the history of philosophy, especially in 
twentieth-century analytic philosophy’s drive to naturalism and the 
emulation of scientific or mathematical inquiry […]. (Tartaglia 2016: 73) 
 
What we should note is that, according to Tartaglia, analytic philosophy’s 
assimilation of philosophical inquiry to the scientific, brought about the 
twentieth-century marginalization of concerns about transcendence. We should 
remark, in addition, that there is suggested to be some connection between 
transcendence and life’s meaning in the quotation. What is transcendence, then, 
and what relationship does it have with the meaning of life? 
Tartaglia, in that book, introduces the concept of transcendence in the 
context of a consideration of the issue about the meaning of life, as explained in 
the following paragraphs.  
We ordinarily live with confidence in the meaningfulness of our daily 
practice, because “the social framework we live within, which has been building 
up over the course of history, makes it seem that our lives have an overall point” 
(Tartaglia 2016: 22). In fact, our social framework brings with it many devices 
such as commercial advertisements, school education, books, and much else, 
which ‘implant’ and reinforce the belief in the meaning of our present activities 
and thereby prevent us from reconsidering whether our life has an ultimate 
meaning at all. We affirm, e.g., the meaningfulness of study in school by saying 
that, if a person does not study well in school, she or he will not earn much in 
the future; and none of us would ever doubt the truth of this in daily life. In this 
sense, we are ordinarily ‘immersed’ in our social framework, just as much as 
non-human animals who are more or less inevitably immersed in their biological 
frameworks (Tartaglia 2016: 24). 
We human beings, however, are not always immersed in the daily 
framework. We can “step back from our framework,” objectify it, and locate it in 
a larger context (Tartaglia 2016: 24). We can, e.g., see our everyday practice 
from the perspective of the physical universe and thereby find that our moral 
behavior, or social activity in general, is just a part of the complex totality of the 
‘law-abiding’ movements of physical matter. This ability to step back from a 
289 
 
given framework Tartaglia calls ‘transcendence’, which he interestingly 
supposes to be “a by-product of the freedom we evolved in the transition from 
the structures of a biological to a more malleable social framework” (Tartaglia 
2016: 24). 
By exercise of this ability of transcendence, we realize that what our social 
framework supposes to be the absolute values in our life, e.g., pleasure, wealth, 
commercial success, industrial development, and so on, are ‘worthless’ things in 
a higher or deeper context. If, e.g., we ascend to the perspective of physical 
nature, then we find that, objectively, there is no axiological difference between 
socially presumed good and bad actions, because both are fundamentally just 
complex sums of value-free movements of micro-physical matter. Every 
normative feature of the world vanishes from the physical perspective. 
Transcendence thus brings about nihilism, i.e., the view that there is no absolute 
value which would ascribe an overall point to our life. There is something true 
about nihilism, and we know it. For, if we step back from the social framework, 
which would ordinarily give some seemingly ultimate point to our daily 
activities, we realize that social matters are just a sort of illusion, and nothing 
matters at a deeper, more fundamental level. The physical universe, in short, is 
indifferent to what happens in our world. Our life in it therefore lacks an overall 
point. 
While many philosophers wish to reject nihilism, Tartaglia rather affirms it, 
partly because that view, he suggests, reflects the truth of our world which our 
ability of transcendence unveils. He adds that, contrary to naïve expectation, 
realizing the truth of nihilism has no grave consequences in our practical life. He 
says that, as a matter of fact, 
 
trying to make money, change the world for the better, become famous, 
find love or just stay out of prison, all remain just as compelling as they 
ever were in light of nihilism, except to the extent that they were thought 
to contribute to an overall purpose to life […]. (Tartaglia 2016: 43) 
 
Even after we find that there is no ultimate goal in our life, we cannot but live in 
our daily social framework. Relative goals like wealth or development, 
therefore, continue to be things we should pursue in our life. What changes, 
then, when we realize the truth of nihilism? Tartaglia says that all we should do 
is “re-engage with the [social] framework” (Tartaglia 2016: 43). We should, in 
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other words, engage ourselves in the same things as before, but now we would 
do so without the illusion that these social activities have an absolute value. 
Nihilism, in short, wakes us up, but does not necessarily imply despair or 
hopelessness. 
Many who regard nihilism as a source of ruination, nevertheless, would seek 
a firm ground on which we hit the ultimate framework, and which no one could 
transcend. Tartaglia himself, however, transcends this common frame of 
thinking, which uncritically supposes that nihilism ruins us. So, his philosophy 
does not begin with the assumption that there may possibly be a firm ground 
which would give us some overall meaning, but rather with the fact that we 
continuously transcend, i.e., objectify and relativize, our given frameworks. I 
will explain this point in the following. How Tartaglia’s focus on transcendence 
determines his conception of philosophy will thereby be clarified. 
The intellectual activity he calls ‘philosophy’ is not a purely ontological 
description of the world within a given framework. It could, should and even 
must in some cases, transcend that fixed framework to ask, “In what respect 
does this kind of ontological description matter?” Even in the midst of an 
exciting inquiry, indeed, we can always, and should sometimes, step back from 
an ‘absorbed’ perspective and ask about the meaning of the inquiry to which we 
are presently devoted. If philosophy is an attempt to understand our world and 
ourselves as a whole, then it should not overlook this transcending feature of our 
movement of thought. In this sense, it is reasonable for Tartaglia to qualify 
‘philosophy’ as involving reflective consideration on the meaning of the issues it 
engages itself with (Tartaglia 2016: 69-70). 
To organize these points, I introduce Tartaglia’s term of ‘enframement’. He 
says that, generally, 
 
if we want to understand the meaning of a particular practice, we do so by 
framing it within the wider context of social life […]. (Tartaglia 2016: 70) 
 
Suppose that, e.g., a student asks, “Why should I study at all?” In order to 
answer, we have to find a comparatively broad framework which locates, within 
it, the practice of study as a means to another end. E.g., when we reply, “If you 
don’t study well, you won’t earn much in the future,” we thereby appeal to the 
framework which determines money as an absolute value, the meaningfulness of 
which is stipulated to be undoubted under the context in question. Needless to 
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say, we can also transcend the latter framework and ask “Why is money 
relevant?” To answer this, we need a broader framework still. 
To understand the meaning of a practice is, therefore, to realize a framework 
in which the practice in question is determined as meaningful. Tartaglia thus 
calls a question of this type, i.e., a question about the meaning of a practice and 
its background framework, “a question of enframement” (Tartaglia 2016: 70). 
Another type of philosophical question, i.e., an ‘objective’ inquiry into the 
fundamental elements of the world, is traditionally called ‘ontology.’ The 
terminology of ‘enframement’ and ‘ontology’ enable us to catch the point of 
Tartaglia’s conception of philosophy. What he suggests is, in short, that our 
philosophical investigation should not only consist of ontology but also 
enframement, even though the interest of the latter kind is marginalized in the 
trend of analytic philosophy, as I already mentioned. 
It is arguable, in fact, that philosophy is originally a sort of two-wheeled 
vehicle for conceiving our existence. E.g., for Plato, a philosopher’s ontological 
knowledge of the transcendent world, or especially the knowledge of the Idea of 
Goodness, would guide our life by telling us what our practice fundamentally 
aims at, as Tartaglia illustrates (Tartaglia 2016: 72). I would like to add 
Spinoza’s Ethics as another example, where the fundamental meaning of our 
intellectual activity is found to be an exercise of our human rational essence as 
determined by God’s eternal nature. Ontology and enframement are thus “tightly 
interwoven” (Tartaglia 2016: 72). Answering the question of the enframement of 
an ontological inquiry would justify the whole philosophical project at a deeper 
level. In this sense, in virtue of the two-wheeled-ness of its concern, philosophy 
would proceed on the right track. If a philosopher, conversely, lost her interest in 
‘transcendent’ explanation and justification of the meaning of her first-order 
ontological research, then her investigation would fail to do all that it could do. 
This would be a significant fault, Tartaglia supposes. I will argue that his 
judgment is relevantly right, through consideration of the free will debate. 
Several chapters, i.e., chapter 4-7, of Tartaglia’s book consider the problems 
of consciousness, time and universals in the light of his ‘two-wheeled’ 
philosophy, although I would like to omit the details. He explicates, throughout 
those chapters, that “experience does not belong to the objective world” 
(Tartaglia 2016: 176). This means that any objective description of reality could 
not exhaust everything there is. Something would always remain, which 
transcends our objectification. Tartaglia calls this supposition the “transcendent 
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hypothesis”, which I take to be another expression of the fact that we 
continuously transcend our given frameworks.  
This ‘hypothesis’ explains why, e.g., the materialist reduction of 
consciousness in philosophy of mind would be unsatisfactory, because such an 
attempt would only succeed in making a clear analysis of the conscious 
phenomenon in the physicalist framework at the price of overlooking, or even 
denying, the dimension of human experiential transcendence. On reflection, 
however, we cannot but realize that we could transcend such a ‘material’ 
framework to conceive an ‘idealistic’ aspect of the phenomenon in question, as 
Kant did. The materialists’ success, in short, carries with it a significant cost. A 
dualist conception of consciousness, on the other hand, would absurdly try to 
objectify the transcendent dimension, without adequate understanding of the 
hypothesis in question. The most important point here is to realize that there is a 
genuinely transcendent feature of human thought and experience. We should, 
therefore, abandon the ambition to describe everything in front of our objective 
eyes. Both the materialists and dualists are caught by ‘a philosophically bad 
obsession’, insofar as they aim to objectify all the essential aspects of the 
conscious phenomenon. 
Repeatedly, the materialists deny transcendence, while the dualists objectify 
it. Generally speaking, it is the dialectic of these two approaches, i.e., negation 
of transcendence and objectification of it, that makes progress in philosophy 
(although, in most cases, the debaters do not explicitly realize that we human 
beings are an essentially transcending existence). This is one of the central 
suggestions developed in the final chapter of Tartaglia’s book. He says that, 
 
[p]hilosophy proceeds as a perennial debate between these two factions, 
with one side reminding us of the fact of transcendence only to take it in 
the wrong direction, and the other side trying to deny it. Thus the first 
provide alternative articulations of transcendent being to that provided by 
objective thought – typically achieved by treating our shadow concepts of 
experience as accurate representation – with this then producing a clash 
with commitments which the other side consider obligatory, such as 
physicalism, positivism or common sense. (Tartaglia 2016: 180) 
 
In addition, 
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the debate goes on and shows no sign of abating, as various approaches to 
affirming or denying transcendence are developed from generation to 
generation; taking in new discoveries and reflecting new interests. This 
constitutes progress in philosophy; a progress which reflects life in that it 
has no prospect of completion. (Tartaglia 2016: 181) 
 
We now reach the point where we can make sense of what I mentioned at the 
beginning of this paper. I said that philosophy is an activity practiced through, 
and throughout, each of our lives. This is because, as Tartaglia suggests, 
philosophical progress consists in deepening our understanding of the world and 
ourselves through continuous exercise of the human ‘privilege’, i.e., our 
transcending nature. When we engage ourselves in a ‘first-order’ philosophical 
inquiry, there are always open possibilities in which we might transcend its 
framework. True, we would plausibly have some ‘natural’ limitation on the 
range of humanly possible transcendence. But, we do not know where the 
boundary is. For us, therefore, philosophical progress has no end. 
To sum up, our transcending nature, which even philosophers sometimes 
ignore or disrespect, makes our practice of philosophy never-ending. Finding a 
definitive answer to a question would, therefore, not be any genuine part of our 
philosophical journey. This point applies also to philosophy of free will. A 
straightforward answer to the naïve question “Are we free or not?” is not a thing 
that philosophers of free will ought to pursue. What should we aim at, then, in 
philosophy of free will? I would like to answer this in the remaining sections. 
 
3. 
 
The compatibilists typically suggest that human freedom is conceivable in 
the framework of physicalism or naturalism. For them, our freedom of will 
would be an immanent phenomenon within the system of mechanistic nature, as 
it were. Some libertarians oppose them by suggesting that proper free will must 
be ‘thicker’ than it. They therefore assume that there are transcending dynamics, 
or “agent causation”, in the objective reality. Another type of libertarian, by 
contrast, equates human freedom just with a kind of indeterministic event and 
suggests that some type of naturalism, insofar as it accommodates 
indeterminism, would be compatible with the existence of freedom of the 
libertarian sort. Most free will skeptics suppose that our genuine freedom is of 
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the ‘thick’ type, and argue that free will in this sense is not realizable in the 
objective world. 
This status quo of the free will debate can be analyzed from a different 
perspective in terms of the terms ‘transcendence’, ‘objectification’ and 
‘negation’. If the fundamental kind of human freedom consists in the movement 
of transcendence of our thinking and experience (as I believe), then, e.g., the 
‘agent-causal’ libertarians are guilty of objectifying such transcendent dynamism 
within their this-worldly causal connections. For dynamics of transcendence 
would essentially evade the net of our objectification, or Vor-sich-stellen. On the 
other hand, the typical compatibilists and naturalistic libertarians attempt to 
conceive human freedom in the framework of physical events and thereby 
overlook, or in some cases negate, the phenomenon of transcendence. The free 
will skeptics should be blamed for the same reason, because they would in most 
cases be devoted just to exposing the non-existence of free will in the objective 
world, and therefore have no respect for the ‘transcendent’ existence of our 
freedom. 
We should remark that almost all the participants in the contemporary 
free-will debate ignore, or fail to rightly conceive, or even consciously deny, the 
possibility of human transcendence. They begin their consideration with the 
supposition that there is a fixed objective reality, and never consider whether or 
not we could step back from that given framework and relativize it, as explained 
in the following manner. 
The pro-freedom debaters would, in fact, just seek what they define as 
human freedom in their particular, ‘prejudiced’ conception of the world. Robert 
Kane, an eminent libertarian, e.g., starts his investigation by accepting a 
naturalistic worldview and analyzes our free choices in terms of indeterministic 
informational-processing of “the two crossing neural networks” in our brain, i.e., 
so-called “parallel processing” (Kane 1999: 312), without critically reflecting 
whether his conception of the world could be transcended or not. What is 
problematic about his stance is, I would suggest, that his concern is exclusively 
focused on locating or constructing something he would call “freedom” within 
his presupposed framework. So, we would find in the process of his thinking, no 
moment of fundamental reflection on the necessity of his particular orientation, 
i.e., of pursuing freedom in the event-causal world. In brief, Kane is, in other 
words, immersed in his presupposed framework and never re-examines it. He, as 
a result of this, fails to turn his eyes on the genuine dimension of human 
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freedom, i.e., ‘transcendent’ liberation from the given framework of thinking 
and living (similar things happen in the work of, e.g., Chisholm and Pereboom, 
to whom I refer in the following).  
As another illustration, Roderick Chisholm, an equally eminent but 
non-naturalistic libertarian, suggests that “the motion of the hand was caused by 
the motion of certain muscles,” and “the motion of the muscles was caused by 
certain events that took place within the brain,” but “some event, and 
presumably one of those that took place within the brain, was caused by the 
agent and not by any other event” (Chisholm 1964: 31). He here objectifies 
human freedom of a ‘transcendent’ kind, i.e., agent causation, within the 
sublunary causal connection, without asking at all whether our genuine freedom 
is transcendent over, or immanent in, the objective reality. If there is something 
absurd about his move, it is explained by Thomas Nagel’s comment that 
Chisholm would “try to force autonomy into the objective causal order” (Nagel 
1986: 115). I.e., if our genuine autonomy belongs not to the objective, or 
objectified, order, but rather to our transcendent objectification of the order in 
question, then any attempt at forcing autonomy into something objectified 
should be judged ‘absurd’; because it is meant to objectify something 
unobjectifiable. 
The anti-freedom debaters could also, in most cases, be blamed for failing to 
rightly capture the genuine dimension of human freedom, for they just aim at 
showing the non-existence of freedom of will within the physical world. They 
would not consider the freedom in our transcending dynamism, i.e., 
transcendental liberation as it were, which would enable us to step back from a 
given framework. Pereboom, e.g., argues that, given our knowledge of natural 
science, agent-causal libertarianism is implausible. He says, 
 
it may turn out that some human neural structures differ significantly from 
anything else in nature we understand, and that they serve to ground agent 
causation. This approach may be the best one for libertarians to pursue. 
But at this point we have no evidence that it will turn out to be correct. 
(Pereboom 2007: 114) 
 
True, we can agree that we have no evidence for the prospect that physics, 
physiology, or neuroscience will discover the existence of agent causation, even 
in the remote future. But, we should remark at the same time, that Pereboom 
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would uncritically accept that human freedom should be found, if possible, 
somewhere in the objective worldview described by natural science. What is 
problematic here is, briefly, that the dimension of human transcendence remains 
completely out of his sight. 
Kane, Chisholm, Pereboom, and most of the other debaters, suppose that 
there exists an objective reality, but never take into consideration our 
transcendence of objectification. It is, however, this ‘naïve’ realism, i.e., the 
supposition that there is one fixed reality, that I would suggest is the root, or at 
least one of the essential roots, of the dialectic deadlock in the recent debate as 
introduced in Section 1. For, if there were one fixed reality, independent of our 
objectification and conceptualization, then there would have to be one true 
answer to the question “Are we free or not?” Adequate observation of this 
reality would tell us the Truth of human freedom. Realism uncritically 
presupposed in the free-will debate thus entails the ‘harmful’ supposition that the 
free-will question has one determinate answer.3 
Why is this harmful, however? It is because, if it is assumed that there is this 
one Reality, then the difference between the core suggestions of libertarianism, 
compatibilism and free will skepticism would turn into an opposition or conflict 
concerning who knows the Truth. What each participant in the debate aims at 
would be, in consequence, to show that only her or his view is true. She or he 
would therefore try to find faults in the other camp’s position, but not to 
understand the good aspects of it. Thus, one speaks and the others just shake 
their heads in disbelief, as Double said. As a result of this, we have dialectical 
deadlock. How can we transcend this ‘suffocating’ situation? 
My answer to this question is that we should keep in mind, and continuously 
reflect on, our transcending nature. Realizing the dimension of human 
transcendence, indeed, enables us to truly say that philosophical progress 
consists in deepening our understanding of the world and ourselves through the 
continuous exercise of transcendence, as I developed in Section 2 by following 
Tartaglia. Our philosophical dialogue, thus, essentially has no end and therefore 
never falls into a deadlock. 
Transcendence would, generally speaking, enable us to keep away from a 
fixed framework of thinking and thereby make sense of a certain ‘inconsistent’ 
view in a ‘rational’ way. It would, e.g., tell us that there is something true, and 
                                                     
3 Only a few exceptional philosophers, some of whom are referred to in footnote 1 of this paper, avoid 
the naïve realism of the contemporary free-will debate. 
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something false, on both sides of the pro-freedom and anti-freedom camps. We 
would therefore have no need to answer which of libertarianism, compatibilism 
and free will skepticism is True. We should rather, e.g., consider in what sense 
each of those views are true and false. I will explain these points in the next, 
final section. The discourse developed in the following is intended as an exercise 
in transcending the dead ends of the debate. Though possibly presumptuous, this 
entails positing a novel dimension for talking about human freedom. I begin my 
argument by objectifying the framework of the debate in a somewhat novel way. 
 
4. 
 
The problem of free will, as transcendent reflection reveals it, can be 
formulated as a conflict between two types of perspective, which would make us 
see the world and ourselves in completely different ways. From one perspective, 
i.e., the ‘daily’ perspective as it were, we see human behavior as action and say 
that, e.g., Mr. A was driven by jealousy and shot Mr. B. Note that, from this 
perspective, we conceive Mr. A’s behavior of shooting as his action. And, insofar 
as we do so, we regard it as a freely chosen and responsible act.  
From the other perspective, i.e., the scientific perspective, however, we see 
human behavior as an event or mere happening and say, e.g., that Mr. A’s brain 
state was such-and-such, the neural firing of such-and-such pattern occurred, 
and then the muscle contraction of such-and-such pattern occurred, with the 
result that the position of the trigger changed, and so forth. We now conceive 
Mr. A’s behavior not as his action (since, from the latter perspective, Mr. A is not 
an agent at all but just a complex sum of physical matter, and therefore Mr. A’s 
behavior is just a combination of physical movements). We rather see it as 
purely ‘impersonal’ event and, insofar as we do so, we regard it as non-free and 
non-responsible.4 
The existence of two types of perspective, and therefore two ways to 
describe the world, leads to the following questions. From which of those 
perspectives should we see human behavior? In which way should we describe 
it? Suppose that a person, say Ms. C, chooses to take the scientific perspective 
and says that Mr. A’s behavior is just an event and so he is not responsible for 
Mr. B’s death. She must be right in some sense, because there is, in fact, a 
                                                     
4 I would define “free will” here by a volitional factor in virtue of which a human being is qualified as 
an agent. Freedom in this sense would have no essential relationship with alternative possibilities. 
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perspective from which to see the world in that way. True, there is another 
perspective, i.e., the daily perspective, to see the world as involving agency. But, 
it can be supposed that Ms. C knows it and yet chooses the ‘impersonal’ one. 
Given this supposition, telling Ms. C that there is another viewpoint would not 
change her idea. Her view that Mr. A’s behavior, or more generally, human 
behavior in general, is not free would thus carry with it some legitimacy.  
Is it the case, however, that each of two ways to describe the world is true in 
its own terms? Should we admit here a kind of relativism which suggests that it 
would be a waste of time to pursue some fruitful dialogue between these two 
ways of discourse? Can we, in the present context, do something more than 
telling Ms. C that there is another viewpoint, in order to argue for our agency 
and freedom?  
My answer, which I am going to explain, is that we can. Certainly, this would 
not imply the ability to convert Ms. C to the pro-freedom school. But, it would 
add a dialectical depth to the present situation, as it were. 
Let me rephrase our question, to begin with. The existence of two ways to 
describe the world brings about the question “Which should we choose?” as 
explained above. Which, then, should we choose between an action narrative 
and an event narrative, as it were? Should we see the world as the space of 
happening and say that our behavior is not free? Or, should we see the world as 
involving agency and ascribe freedom and responsibility to some of our 
behavior?  
I argue that choosing one way to see the world and to describe it, in response 
to this question, is also an action. Selection is an action. It is, in other words, not 
just anything happening in the space of events but rather something an agent 
does. When trying to choose an answer to the question of “Which should we 
choose?” therefore, we are already inside the space of action. We then 
pragmatically presuppose that we are agents and can choose our own lives. 
Even if a person takes the scientific perspective and describes human 
behavior as an event or happening, as Ms. C did about Mr. A’s behavior, that 
person’s act of describing nevertheless figures among human actions. More 
fundamentally, insofar as we are “homines narrantes,” i.e., story-telling human 
beings, we always live within the space of actions. As a result of this, to say 
“Everything is mere event, so there is no action at all” would be inevitably 
absurd in an important sense, for a person’s saying so implies putting out of 
view the fact that she or he says so (this is an action!). 
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The same thing applies to freedom. Should we describe human behavior as 
freely chosen? Or, should we view it as a matter of happening? Choosing one 
among these ways of discourse cannot but be an exercise of freedom. Generally 
speaking, when we choose something, we are already inside the space of 
freedom, as it were, for otherwise we would not be genuine subjects of the 
choice. As a result of this, to say “we are just composites of micro-physical 
movements, so there are no free agents who are truly subjects of behavior” 
would again be absurd. A person’s saying that, in fact, implies the so-called 
‘self-destructive’ negation of his or her own freely choosing to say so.5 
It turns out therefore that we can save the space of actions and freedom at 
the ultimate level. In fact, at the very time when we ask “Are we free agents or 
mere composites of events?” we find ourselves in the space of freedom. Our 
asking something is also among human actions. Our question “Are we free?” 
should, therefore, be affirmatively answered at the very time of its being 
questioned. The existence of human freedom is thus saved at the fundamental 
level. 
This is what I would like to say when I reply to a person like Ms. C, who 
says, “Our behavior is never free.” What I intend by saying so, however, is not 
that Mr. A’s behavior of shooting must be a free action. Rather, I intend to 
remark that, independently of what Ms. C says about the behavior in question, 
we anyway cannot say, e.g., “There is no free action at all,” unless we would fall 
into absurdity. I would suggest further that, if someone asserts that everything 
just happens in accordance with the laws of nature, then her or his statement 
would be self-destructive in an important sense. If, in fact, such a statement were 
true, then her or his assertion would be a mere happening, and therefore it would 
not be any action which could sensibly be ascribed accountability. Likewise, her 
or his saying so would be the same sort of noise. I would thus suggest that the 
‘assertion’ in question has an absurd implication like “Treat this claim just as a 
natural phenomenon, like noise!” 
Certainly, in response to these suggestions, someone might continue to say, 
e.g., “It is exactly the case: I admit that what my assertion implies, and 
everything, including this claim, is just a happening.” I should say here that I 
have nothing to say in reply to him or her. What I have said in the last paragraph, 
however, would justify this resignation. We would have no duty to reply to his 
                                                     
5 This is so, at least insofar as ‘freedom’ here is understood as a factor in virtue of which a human 
being is qualified as an agent, as remarked in the last note. 
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or her voice if it was just a mere noise as he or she ‘suggests’. 
To sum up, we cannot live outside the space of actions and freedom, insofar 
as we are homines narrantes or res cogitantes (since thinking is also an action in 
a broad sense). In this sense, nobody can consistently suggest that there is no 
free action. So, there must be something true about the pro-freedom camp in the 
free-will debate. The point can be explained or enlarged in terms of the concept 
of transcendence. Even if we try to talk about everything as mere happening, 
there remains some residue which keeps its bearing over our event narrative. 
I.e., our fundamental freedom, as exercised in our talking, will not be captured 
as something unfree, as objectified in the event narrative. In this sense, our 
freedom of the ‘deepest’ kind is transcendent and therefore it does not belong to 
the objective causal order; and this is what Tartaglia’s transcendent hypothesis 
says about conscious experience. 
We have thus dis-covered that the space of free actions is never closed so 
long as we live. We should remark, however, that a truth sometimes covers up 
another truth. The truth found in the last paragraphs, i.e., the truth that we cannot 
view everything as mere happening, would, in fact, conceal the antipodal truth 
that human behavior must be just an event. This truth, I will argue, we cannot 
express in a straightforward way. In fact, as I already explained, if we say that 
all of our behavior is mere happening, then we immediately fall into absurdity. 
This is one of the main reasons why free will skepticism, which suggests that we 
have no freedom of will, sounds inconsistent. There is, however, something true 
about the radical denial of human freedom, as I will explain in the following. 
Why should we believe that human beings are unfree? It is because we are 
not, e.g., infinite gods, i.e., exercisers of absolute freedom, but rather just finite 
individuals that belong to the natural world. True, there is a good sense in which 
it can be said that human beings participate of ‘divine’ ability. E.g., 
understanding the meaning of something is a sort of ‘divine’ art, insofar as mere 
animals could not do it. Transcendence, in short, makes us divine to some 
degree. Nonetheless, we are also just parts of the system of nature. Our behavior 
should therefore be one of the events in the global system of causal connection. 
A human being is a part of nature. It cannot be, therefore, a subject of 
independent autonomy. If the word ‘substance’ is a word applied only to 
something independently autonomous, there is no human substance in the world. 
Human beings, metaphorically speaking, are parts of the flow of a big river. Our 
behavior must be mere happening at least in this fundamental sense.  
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Nonetheless, as stressed earlier, the fundamental eventhood of human 
behavior is hard to talk about. This is so, even if it is obvious that our behavior 
cannot but be an event as a part of the order of nature, because, to repeat the 
reason, saying that there is no action would imply absurdity. Our question is thus 
the following: How can we consistently talk about the fundamental eventhood of 
our behavior? Or, in other words, what should we say in order to understand 
why we, who already found that human behavior is necessarily free at the 
ultimate level, can admit that our behavior is fundamentally unfree? How can 
we understand this contradiction? 
My central suggestion is that the fundamental eventhood of our behavior 
cannot be endorsed by us in any direct, or straightforward, way. Its endorsement 
rather requires some medium. If you reflect on the history of thought, you would 
realize that many profound thinkers reached endorsement of the fundamental 
eventhood of our behavior through various paths of mediation (in a more or less 
Hegelian sense). Medieval philosophers or theologians, e.g., contemplated God 
and found His freedom in divine decision to be of the ideal kind. For them, only 
God is truly qualified as free. Human decisions, on the contrary, are just free in a 
very limited, ‘incomplete’ way. Our freedom to make them is a mere shadow of 
the Idea of Divine Freedom, so to speak. Human beings are not masters of their 
own action, but their behavior is a result of God’s choice. In this sense, our 
behavior is not what we do, but something properly called “happening” as a 
remote effect of causa prima. 
Contemplation of the divine perfection, nonetheless, is not demanded as a 
necessary condition for recognizing the eventhood of our behavior. What is 
required would rather be realization of our own finite nature. And, in order to be 
aware of our finitude, it would be necessary to transcend our own sphere and 
relativize it through mediation with something beyond us. Here is the reason 
why the eventhood in question cannot be conceived in a ‘direct’ way. 
Endorsement of it would require self-transcendence, and relativization through 
mediation with something beyond us would open a perspective on which we 
could conceive ourselves as unfree. 
I suggest that scientific reflection on the world also would tell us of the 
limitation of our mastery, as theological contemplation informs us of our 
imperfection of agency. If we view ourselves, e.g., from a physical point of 
view, we conceive human behavior, not as a process of self-determination and 
self-control, but rather as a consequence of some universal laws. From such a 
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scientific perspective, human beings could not renew the world by their action, 
but rather they would just be subjected to the universal laws which govern the 
world. More precisely, the scientific point of view would pull human beings 
back into the dimension in which the distinctions of master/slave, 
free/constraint, and so on, would no longer make sense, because there is no 
room for action within the space of events opened by the ‘cool’ perspective in 
question. 
Let me summarize. When we talk about something, we live within the space 
of action, as I stressed above (since to talk is an action). The space of actions is, 
therefore, the ultimate field of human life in which we continuously find 
ourselves. We human beings, however, are not necessarily immersed in this 
space. We can transcend it, while we are still always within it. We can, in fact, 
step back from our own absolute perspective and relativize it through mediation 
with something beyond us (e.g., God and natural law). We would, in this way, 
find that our behavior is just mere happening of which we have no ultimate 
control. There must be therefore something true about the anti-freedom camps in 
the free-will debate. 
We should remark that, insofar as the pro-freedom and anti-freedom camps 
both suggest something true, the philosophers of free will ought not to seek a 
straightforward answer to the question of “Are we free or not?” The right track 
would be, I suggest, to keep away from this naïve question.  
Someone might be afraid, however, that there would remain nothing for us 
to do in philosophy of free will if we stopped asking whether or not we are free. 
I would suggest that there remain many things. We can, e.g., try to make explicit 
under what framework of thought we engage ourselves in in our first-order 
practice of philosophy, as Tartaglia did in his book and I did in this paper. Our 
transcending nature would leave us many things to do in order to deepen our 
understanding of the world and ourselves. In this sense, I said above that 
philosophy is an activity practiced through, and throughout, each of our lives. 
Concretely speaking, each of the three main camps in the free-will debate, 
libertarianism, compatibilism, and free will skepticism, must have its 
unconsidered framework of investigation. To explicate what it is might be, I 
suggest, one of the things we should be attempting to do. This attempt might, as 
I hope it will, break the dialectical dead end we now face in philosophy of free 
will. 
I will finish my paper with a brief critical comment on one of Tartaglia’s 
303 
 
suggestions in his book. I completely sympathize with his conception of 
philosophy as an activity practiced through, and throughout, each of our lives, if 
I correctly understand him. I would therefore argue that Tartaglia could affirm 
life’s meaning in a deepened sense as it were, because he should find some 
‘meaning’ in our engagement in such perennial philosophical conversation. True, 
he is right in suggesting that any social meaning could be transcended and 
therefore it should not be a final aim which would give our life an overall point. 
I remark that his suggestion of this point is very significant because it would 
make us realize the transcendent dimension of our thinking about meaning. 
However, I would note that Tartaglia unnecessarily emphasizes the 
meaninglessness of our life to an excessive degree, because his discourse seems 
at least to me to imply that there is a deeper dimension of meaning of life than 
the ordinary, social one. Tartaglia says, e.g., 
 
[t]here would still be plenty of philosophy to do, of course, because there 
are many routes to transcendence to explore; some of which have 
doubtless yet to be discovered. And there is endless potential for 
investigating the nature and scope of our misrepresentation of 
transcendent being […]. The task could not end, because every new 
generation needs to make philosophical ideas their own. (Tartaglia 2016: 
181) 
 
I would argue that, if such a philosophical journey is worth making, then a life 
including it would be meaningful in some sense. I can agree with Tartaglia that, 
insofar as any social meaning could be relativized, our life could not be 
‘meaningful’ in the sense that some social framework would supply it with an 
overall purpose. I should admit that our life cannot but be like a drifting ship 
with no destination. I would nevertheless argue that, insofar as, e.g., “every new 
generation needs to make philosophical ideas their own,” such activities should 
have some meaning in another sense, though what this sense would be, I 
suggest, is among the hard questions appearing in our perennial philosophical 
journey. Deepening our understanding of life’s meaning that we cannot but 
admit at some level would belong to the intellectual activity authentically called 
the ‘philosophy of meaning of life’. 
 
 
304 
 
References 
 
Chisholm, Roderick M., 1964. “Human Freedom and the Self,” at The 
University of Kansas Lindley Lecture: 3-15, reprinted in Watson 2003: 26-37. 
Clarke, Randolph, 1993. “Toward a Credible Agent-Causal Account of Free 
Will,” Noûs, 27: 191-203, reprinted in Watson 2003: 285-298. 
Double, Richard, 1991. The Non-Reality of Free Will, New York, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Double, Richard, 1996. Metaphilosophy and Free Will, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Fischer, John Martin, 2002. “Frankfurt-Style Compatibilism,” in S. Buss and L. 
Overton (eds.), The Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes from Hurry 
Frankfurt, The MIT Press, reprinted in Watson 2003: 190-211. 
Honderich, Ted, 1993/2002. How Free Are You? 2nd ed. at 2002, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Kane, Robert, 1999. “Responsibility, Luck, and Chance: Reflections on Free 
Will and Indeterminism,” Journal of Philosophy, 96: 217-240, reprinted in 
Watson 2003: 299-321. 
Metz, Thaddeus, 2013. Meaning in Life, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Nagel, Thomas.1986. The View From Nowhere, New York, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Pereboom, Derk, 2007. “Hard Incompatibilism,” ch.3 of J. Fischer, R. Kane, D. 
Pereboom and M. Vargas (eds.), Four Views on Free Will, Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishing. 
Smilansky, Saul, 2000. Free Will and Illusion, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Sommers, Tamler, 2012. Relative Justice, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Strawson, Peter, 1962. “Freedom and Resentment,” Proceedings of the British 
Academy, 48: 1-25, reprinted in Watson 2003: 72-93. 
Tartaglia, James, 2016. Philosophy in a Meaningless Life: A System of Nihilism, 
Consciousness and Reality, London: Bloomsbury Academic. 
Watson, Gary, 2003. Free Will, 2nd ed., Oxford, New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
Wolf, Susan, 2010. Meaning in Life and Why It Matters, Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press. 
